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ZNY CCCCC ZOC STATE ZZH
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DE RUEHC #3296 3140630
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O 140122Z NOV 8.
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUFHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 0000
RUTACU/AMEMBASSY COTONOU IMMEDIATE 0000
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI IMMEDIATE 0000
INFO RUTABA/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA IMMEDIATE 0000
RUFHPS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS IMMEDIATE 0000
RUEHCG/AMEMBASSY BRAZZAVILLE IMMEDIATE 0000
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 0000
RUTAAK/AMEMBASSY CONAKRY IMMEDIATE 0000
RUTADR/AMEMBASSY DAKAR IMMEDIATE 0000
RUQMKM/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM IMMEDIATE 0000
RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA IMMEDIATE 0000
RUFHOS/AMEMBASSY LAGOS IMMEDIATE 0000
RUFHLC/AMEMBASSY LIBREVILLE IMMEDIATE 0000
RUFHPC/AMEMBASSY LOME IMMEDIATE 0000
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 0000
RUFHYC/AMEMBASSY NIAMEY IMMEDIATE 0000
RUTADE/AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE IMMEDIATE 0000
RJEHOT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 0000
BT
EZ1:
C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 303296
EZ2:
E.O. 12065:GDS 11/13/87 (-EVITSKY, MELVYN)
TAGS: PINR, PORG, FR, CD, UN
SUBJ: APPROACH TO UN FOR FINANCING CHAD PKO
REF: A) COTONOU 2145; B) STATE 300141; C) STATE 300521;
D) USUN 4026
1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT)
2. DEPARTMENT APPRECIATES COTONOU AND USUN
REPORTING ON FRENCH VIEWS CONCERNING OAU APPROACH
TO UN ON FINANCING PKO FOR CHAD. WE NOTED REF D THAT
MOST IMMEDIATE NEED IS TO GET PKO ORGANIZED AND
EMPLACED IN CHAD AND THAT EFFORT TO SEEK UNSC FUNDING
NOW WOULD LIKELY MEAN SERIOUS DELAY. IN ORDER TO
EXPEDITE EMPLACEMENT OF PKO, WE BELIEVE OAU AND
TROOP CONTRIBUTING COUNTRIES WILL NEED FIRST-OF ALL
TO DETERMINE WHAT SHORT TERM ASSISTANCE IS REQUIRED
AND THEN TO SEEK THAT ASSISTANCE AS QUICKLY AS
C O N F I D E N T I A L

State Dept. review completed

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POSSIBLE, WHICH IN OUR VIEW MEANS SEEKING IT BILATERALLY.
3. AT THE SAME TIME, WE BELIEVE IT IS NECESSARY TO DISCUSS DIRECTLY WITH THE QUAI WHAT THE GOF HAS IN MIND WHEN IT PROPOSES. ONCE THE OAU FORCE IS IN PLACE IN CHAD, SEEKING UN FUNDING IN RETURN FOR SOME MEASURE OF UN CONTROL OVER THE OPERATION. OUR INITIAL IMPRESSION IS THAT THERE WOULD BE BOTH ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF UN INVOLVEMENT. WE RECOGNIZE THAT THE UN COULD PROVIDE BETTER INFRASTRUCTURE AND MORE SECURE FUNDING, AND THAT THE PROSPECT OF THE LATTER MIGHT ENCOURAGE OAU MEMBERS TO CONTRIBUTE TROOPS NOW. HOWEVER, FINANCIAL BENEFITS OF RESORT TO UN ARE MUCH GREATER FOR FRANCE (WHICH PAYS 7.5 PER CENT UNDER UN PEACEKEEPING ASSESSMENT SCALE) THAN FOR US (WHICH PAYS 30.3 PER CENT). MOREOVER, WE BELIEVE UN FUNDING WOULD BE POSSIBLE, IF AT ALL, ONLY WITH FULL UN CONTROL, AND SUCH CONTROL WOULD TRANSFORM A REGIONAL OPERATION INTO ONE POTENTIALLY SUBJECT TO VETO OF PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL.
4. FOR PARIS: EMBASSY SHOULD PROBE FRENCH THINKING FURTHER, MAKING FOLLOWING POINTS AS APPROPRIATE:
-- WE KNOW THAT FRANCE SHARES OUR VIEW OF THE URGENCY OF THE INITIAL CHAD PEACEKEEPING FORCE DEPLOYMENT AND ARE PLEASED FRANCE DOES NOT FAVOR ANY REFERENCE TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL NOW, WHICH COULD SERIOUSLY DELAY DEPLOYMENT.
-- WE ARE INTERESTED IN FRENCH IDEAS FOR UN INVOLVEMENT IN THE LONGER TERM.
-- AS GOF KNOWS, THERE IS NO PRECEDENT FOR SUCH INVOLVEMENT.
-- WHILE UN CHARTER SPEAKS OF UNSC USING REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS FOR "ENFORCEMENT ACTION" UNDER UNSC AUTHORITY, THIS HAS NEVER BEEN PUT INTO PRACTICE. PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS ARE UNDERTAKEN WITH THE CONSENT OF THE PARTIES AND ARE NOT RPT NOT CONSIDERED "ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS" UNDER CHARTER.
-- INDEED, ADVANTAGE OF REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IS THEIR ABILITY TO DEAL WITH REGIONAL PROBLEMS ON A REGIONAL BASIS, WITH LESS PRESSURE FROM GLOBAL POLICY CONSIDERATIONS THAN WOULD OCCUR IN UN.
--HOW WOULD GOF SEE UN INVOLVEMENT IN SUPPORT OF CHAD FORCE WORKING IN PRACTICE?
--WOULD OAU, ONCE FORCE IS ESTABLISHED, SIMPLY TURN IT OVER TO THE UNSC?
--ONCE THERE IS UN FUNDING, WHO WOULD PROVIDE THE MANDATE FOR THE FORCE, PROVIDE DAY-TO-DAY CONTROL AND GIVE GUIDANCE IN THE EVENT OF CHANGED CONDITIONS? WOULD THE UN THEN PAY THE NATIONAL CONTINGENTS?
--WHAT ROLE DOES FRANCE SEE THE SOVIET UNION PLAYING? IT WOULD BE UNDER AFRICAN PRESSURE TO SUPPORT THE FORCE, BUT WOULD IT ALSO BE ABLE TO USE THE CONTROL IT GAINS BY UN INVOLVEMENT TO INFLUENCE WHAT THE FORCE DOES (OR DOES NOT DO) IN CHAD?
--WHAT WOULD THE ROLE BE FOR THE OAU ONCE THE UN IS INVOLVED--WOULD IT BE AN INTERMEDIARY FOR CONTROL OF THE FORCE, OR WOULD IT ONLY ASSUME AN ADVISORY FUNCTION?

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

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**IS THERE A SEPARATE ISSUE OF UN TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE IN THE OPERATION OF THE FORCE, AS DISTINCT FROM UN FUNDING AND CONTROL?
--WHEN DOES THE GOF SEE THE OAU APPROACHING THE UNSC ABOUT THE CHAD FORCE--IMMEDIATELY ONCE THE TROOPS ARRIVE IN CHAD, OR LATER?
5. FOR NAIROBI: WHEN YOU NEXT TALK TO MOI YOU SHOULD CONVEY TO HIM SUBSTANCE OF PARA 2 ABOVE, STRESSING THAT WE BELIEVE ANY EXPLORATION OF POSSIBILITY OF UN FINANCING OF LONG TERM PKO EXPENSES SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO DISTRACT THE IMMEDIATE EFFORT TO PUT THE PKO IN - - PLACE.
6. FOR COTONOU: DEPARTMENT CONCURS THAT WE SHOULD DO NOTHING THAT WOULD ENCOURAGE INCLUSION OF BENIN IN THE PKO. ON THE OTHER HAND, GIVEN OAU SENSITIVITY ON EVEN THE APPEARANCE OF OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE, WE DO NOT WANT TO ACTIVELY LOBBY AGAINST BENIN'S PARTICIPATION IF MOI AND THE OAU REQUEST IT. CLARK

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